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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

JAMES T. DIKEOU and HELEN
K. DIKEOU, individually and as
the natural parents and heirs
of the estate of THEODORE
"TED" JAMES DIKEOU, deceased,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

Case No. 930182-CA
Oral Argument
Priority 15

vs.
MICHAEL D. DOWDALL, M.D.,
JEFFREY S. OSBORN. H,D., and
HCA HEALTH SERVICES OF UTAH,
dba ST. MARK'S HOSPITAL,
Defendants-Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

JURISDICTION
This is an appeal as of right from a final judgment in a civil
case in the district court. Jurisdiction was conferred on the Utah
Supreme Court by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (Supp. 1992).

As

authorized by § 78-2-2(4), the Supreme Court transferred the case
to the Court of Appeals on or about March 30, 1993. The Court of
Appeals has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j).
ISSUES PRESENTED
1.
summary

Were there disputed
judgment, where the

factual
affidavit

issues which

precluded

of plaintiffs' expert

affirmatively showed that he had expertise helpful to the court

concerning defendant's failure to give proper care to the decedent?
The propriety of summary judgment and the admissibility of the
expert's affidavit both present legal issues which are reviewed for
correctness, with no deference to the trial court. Butterfield v.
Okubo. 831 P.2d 97, 102 (Utah 1992).
2.

Does a technical non-compliance with the procedural

requirements of Rule 4-501 justify the trial court in disregarding
obvious factual disputes, where the record plainly shows that the
facts are disputed?

This Court should review to determine if the

trial court abused its discretion.

See Berrett v. Denver and Rio

Grande Western RR Co. , 830 P.2d 291, 293 (Ct. App.), cert, denied,
836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992).
3.
record

Did the trial court err in purporting to bolster the
after

judgment?

having

granted

defendant's

motion

for

summary

This presents a question of law to be reviewed de novo

by the court. See Olson v. Park-Craicr-Olson, Inc. . 815 P.2d 1356,
1359 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
A copy of Rule 4-501 of the. Utah Code of Judicial Administration is reproduced in the addendum.

Appellants are not aware of

any other constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules,
or regulations, whose interpretation is determinative of the issues
on appeal.
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STATEMENT OP THE CASE
A.

Nature
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James and
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their deceased son, Ted Dikeou, filed their Complaint and Jury
Demand on July

Named * defendants were Dr.
* i an., who a 1 legedly

failed to properly tre.i^
Hospita

^ Dikeou, causing his death;

*vr*~.i - - taken for treatmei
T =id Dikeou

..... J, * >*logist, who

allegedly misprescribed medication for Ted Dikeo

hereby causing

his death. (Id.)

E c ] 1 :::) i i :i in: ig c , sched'uling conference held February 11 , 1992 , t
court gave plaintiffs approximate1992 ,

designate the

month, until March 16,

^r-»

il mi I 11 i < v , \ u » i i

i 11 »bses.

before the time that plaintiffs were
designated
summary

j udgment

their* experts, defendant
im

I I i > i ) i i m 111 I

II II I

Osborn mov ed

11 I a n 11II i ( I: t ;

1 m, 11 I

i Il

for
>, i. t

designated an expert 'witness able to establish breach o( the dut',
of care and causation.
served their designator

(R. 132-34, 135-203,)
i nesFe1-

\\ \ \\

Plaintiffs timely
i|(

IM

| I.

n)

and r^sponac

motion for summary judgment ten days

later,

,R, 225-251.)

March - . \v^2
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Plaintiffs'' response was

based primarily on the affidavit of J. Fred Bushnell, M.D., an
emergency room physician.

(R. 232-237.)

Osborn moved to strike the affidavit of Dr. Bushnell.
252-53.)

(R.

Plaintiffs timely filed their response to the motion to

strike on April 16, 1992.

(R. 273-86.)

In a signed minute entry

filed the next day, the court granted both defendant's motion for
summary judgment and the motion to strike the affidavit of Dr.
Bushnell.

(R. 287-90.)

In the minute entry, the court stated it

had reviewed certain memoranda but gave no indication it had
reviewed plaintiffs' memorandum in opposition to the motion to
strike, filed the day before the ruling. (Id.) The formal Summary
Judgment and Order was entered May 8, 1992.

(R. 340-43.)

Following the court's signed minute entry granting summary
judgment, defendant sought to bolster the record by including
additional materials which defendant claimed supported the summary
judgment.

(R. 297-98.)

The motion was filed May 8, 1992, and the

court entered an order granting the motion on the same day (R. 3 3839) , several days prior to the time plaintiffs' response to the
motion would have been due.1
The case against the remaining two defendants was settled on
or about July 21, 1992.

(R. 356.)

An order dismissing the case

*The certificate of service attached to the motion indicates
that it was hand delivered to plaintiffs' counsel on Friday, May 1,
1992. Plaintiffs' response would have been due no sooner than
Monday, May 11, 1992. Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Rule
4-501(1)(b); Utah R. Civ. P. 6(e). Pursuant to Rule 4-501(1)(d),
the court should not have decided the matter until after submission
of a notice to submit for decision.
4

was entered September

.

(R. 358-60.

Appea

Plaintiffs timely

Jtober

Statement of Facts.

ippropriat*

summary

judgment proceeding, the following facts are stated
most favorable tc plaintiffs, ai id reasonable inferences are drawn
in plaintiffs' favor where appropriate,, Wineaar v, Froerer Corp. ,
813 P 2d 104 (Utah 1991).
Ted Dikeou had a moderately common condition identified as the
Wolff-Parkinson-White syndrome (WPW)

which relates

electrical conduct inn •» •,,it IIIII in I III > IHMIIII f
proper medical treatment,

Osborr

February

cardiologist (R.

Jikeou called

reported that his heart was beatinq fast.

cause

| III III

likely have achieved a normal

life expectancy

evening

an abnormal

Osborn and

Ted said that he had

increased heart bea

, . Osborn advised

Ted to

^i ,—w symptoms would abate
)

Ted's heart beat clii d i lot slow down, a~r* h- -ailed ~again early in ** c morning of February 21,
a

- -..
injection.

9C<

Osborn
) Dr.

11 < i' I

-. . Osborn discussed where

Ted inquired whether

^ould be
because

5

*-• could obtain the
^ :
,

3w

LO the

^P to hi s

home.

Dr. Osborn informed Ted that Dr. Osborn did not have staff

privileges at St. Mark's Hospital, but stated that it would be fine
if Ted went there for treatment.

(R. 157, 183, 248.)

Ted Dikeou walked into the emergency room at St. Mark's
Hospital.

(R. 173.)

He was able to converse with the emergency

room physician in a normal manner.

(R. 187.)

When Ted's mother,

Helen Dikeou, suggested that the emergency room physician call Dr.
Osborn, Ted gave him the telephone number for Dr. Osborn.

(R.

167.)
Dr. Dowdall, the emergency room physician, called Dr. Osborn
and discussed Ted's condition with him.

Dr. Dowdall reported that

Ted was in paroxysmal atrial tachycardia (PAT).

(R. 158.)

Dr.

Osborn made no effort to verify the diagnosis but suggested that
the appropriate treatment was IV Verapamil.

(Id.)

In fact, Ted was not suffering from PAT, but was in atrial
fibrillation.

(R. 159.)

This was revealed by the monitor strip

from the EKG

(R. 199) , and Dr. Osborn presumably could have

determined that had he gone to the hospital to verify Dr. Dowdall's
diagnosis. Verapamil is not an appropriate medication for someone
experiencing atrial fibrillation.

(R. 160.)

As a result of the improper medication given to Ted, he went
into cardiac

arrest.

The hospital

electrical defibrillation.

(R. 190.)

staff performed

CPR and

The efforts at overcoming

the effect of the medication were unsuccessful, and Ted left the

6

emergency room ^~ ~
(See

(R. 168.) He passed away March 2, 1990.

I
Dowdall , the emergency room physician, would liked to have

had Ted Dikeou

lother hospital so that

created

claimed that .* could not treat him at the St. Mar*
room, bec^iie='

lacked privileges there.

Mark's, h * -

(R.

f ?

icivise him against going there.

emergency

leo ^ Although

(R.

i

Had Dr. Osborn requested, he undoubtedly would have been granted
emergency
situation.

(R. 235,

Mark'

.Isbor'

no Ted's death

- • -.d later go to St

examined Ted, reviewed his medical

re

s condition with Mr. and

Mrs. Dikeou.

(R. c

Osborn's

refusal

u

adequate

diagnosis IUJI his patient resulted i
23 6.)
provided to
condition,

treatment and

- ath ot Ted Dikeou.

Osborn knew or should have known that the medication
Dikeou
)

Dowdal
The excuse given by

treating his patient, that he did not ha\* >staf \ rr> vilege^
Mark's, w>.
Dr. Osborn could have received courtesy staff privilege
could have otherwise provided for
)

7

adequate treatment „

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This case was decided on a motion for summary judgment.

All

reasonable inferences from the depositions and affidavits should
have been drawn in favor of the plaintiffs, and any doubt as to the
propriety of summary judgment should have been resolved in favor of
plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs have the burden to present expert testimony showing
that Dr. Osborn's treatment of Ted Dikeou fell below the applicable
standard of care.

Although Dr. Osborn was a cardiologist, the

primary issue in this case was not unique to the specialty of
cardiology,

but

rather

involved

the

relationship

between

a

patient's primary physician and the emergency room personnel.
Plaintiffs fulfilled their burden by presenting the affidavit of J.
Fred Bushnell, M.D., an emergency room physician with extensive
practice in Utah and other states.

Dr. Bushnell7s affidavit

affirmatively showed that he was familiar with the standard of care
applicable to Dr. Osborn. The trial court erred in failing to read
the affidavit in the light most favorable to plaintiffs and in
striking the affidavit and granting summary judgment.
Plaintiffs' failure to strictly comply with the procedural
requirements of Rule 4-501 did not justify entry of summary
judgment against plaintiffs.
issues of fact.

The record clearly showed disputed

The trial court erred in mechanically enforcing

the provisions of the rule.
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Summary judgment must be based

~he documents on f * ** at the

time

in 1 ' >- *

i1: issued a signed m i n u t e entry g r a n t i n g
Defendant's

attempt

olster

'"

in

ammary

the record

after

judgment.

t h e fact w a s

improper, a r
motion to

tl

def endant s
to the record,
ARGUMENT
POINT I

SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS IMPROPER BECAUSE
THE AFFIDAVIT OF J. FRED BUSHNELL CREATED A FACTUAL ISSUE
CONCERNING DR. OSBORN'S NEGLIGENCE.
response
plaintiffs

had

establisr

Osborn's motion
the

burden.

standard

nedica

care applicabl

hat burden by offering

^ushnell, M.D.

-

> 4-

adde*
whose

breach

Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612

iaintiffs '

Affidavi

o

Osborn

-.hat standard, and resulting damages.

(Utah Ct. App. 1988)

ummary judgment,

copy

i ii

Ji i shi ie] ] ,
Hi^./.

competent

. specialty

wat>

emergency

, ^oc\

medicine,

was not

ostifv c o n c e r n i n g t h e s t a n d a r d c^ _ a i ^ a p p l i c a b l e t o
•

Plaintiffs are aware of the standards relating ^witness affidavits.

expert

Notwithstanding language that affida\ ts are
I

9

i""! ]

opposing summary judgment, e.g., Themy v. Seagull Enterprises,
Inc. . 595 P.2d 526, 528-29 (Utah 1979), and that all doubts be
resolved in favor of proceeding to trial, King v. Searle Pharmaceuticals, Inc. . 832 P.2d 858, 865 (Utah 1992), the Utah Supreme Court
has imposed stiffer requirements on expert witness affidavits than
would be required if the expert were present in person.

Butter-

field v. Okubo. 831 P.2d 97, 102 (Utah 1992). An expert witness at
trial can testify without detailing the underlying facts or data,
unless in the fluid give-and-take of trial the judge or opposing
party require greater foundation. In a summary judgment affidavit,
however, the expert is required to anticipate possible foundation
objections and affirmatively show the facts reviewed and the basis
for the expert opinion.

Id.

The affidavit of Dr. Bushnell satisfies this stringent test.
Dr. Bushnell had practiced in Utah and had extensive experience in
other states and foreign countries. (R. 240-43.)

He detailed the

records he had reviewed to become familiar with the facts (R. 23 3
55 8-9), and restated the important facts in giving his opinion.
(R. 233-36 55 11-23.)
Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence states:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact
in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of
an opinion or otherwise.

10

Consistent with this rule, a medical practitioner in one field
has knowledge which "will assist the trier of fact" concerning the
practice in another medical specialty, if the expert affirmatively
shows that he or she is familiar with the standard of care
applicable to the other specialty.

Burton v. Youncrblood, 711 P.2d

245, 248 (Utah 1985).
A related aspect of this rule is that a specialist in one
field may testify concerning the negligence of a specialist in
another field if the negligence relates to an issue not within the
specialty.

Slayton v. Brunner,

633

S.W.2d

29

(Ark. 1982),

illustrates this exception. Slayton suffered a cardiac arrest and
died following surgery performed by Brunner.

Brunner moved for

summary judgment and submitted expert testimony to show he was not
negligent.

The plaintiff opposed the motion with the affidavit of

an anesthesiologist. The defendant argued and the trial court held
that an anesthesiologist could not testify concerning the standard
of care applicable to a surgeon.

The Arkansas Supreme Court

disagreed:
Appellee Brunner argues that Dr. King, an
anesthesiologist, is not qualified to testify
as an expert in the specialty of surgery.
However, both are medical school graduates
licensed to practice in their respective
states. Appellant does not allege that appellee was negligent in performing the actual
surgical procedure used to repair the ventral
hernia and remove the marlex mesh. Negligence
is alleged in procedures performed or omitted
before and after the actual surgery.

11

633 S.W.2d at 30.
remanded for trial.

The court reversed the summary judgment and
Accord Harlev v. Catholic Medical Center of

Brooklyn and Queens, Inc., 88 Misc. 2d 126, 386 N.Y.S.2d 955, 957
(Sup. Ct. 1976), aff'd, 57 A.D.2d 827, 394 N.Y.S.2d 62 (App. Div.
1977) (doctor of another specialty qualified to testify if "the
inquiry falls within his expertise,
specialty.")

as distinguished from his

(emphasis by the court).

The issue in the instant case concerned the relationship
between the patient's regular physician and an emergency room
physician, an area well within Dr. Bushnell's expertise.

The

claimed negligence in this case did not deal with an issue unique
to Dr. Osborn's specialty.

Dr. Osborn, a cardiologist, was the

decedent's primary physician.

The decedent entered St. Mark's

Hospital for treatment of a heart problem.

Dr. Osborn consulted

with the St. Mark's emergency room physician by telephone, but
declined to provide necessary personal diagnosis because he did not
have staff privileges at St. Mark's. The emergency room physician
told Dr. Osborn by telephone that the decedent was experiencing
paroxysmal atrial tachycardia (PAT).

Based on this information,

Dr. Osborn concurred with the emergency room physician's proposed
treatment.
In fact, the decedent was experiencing atrial fibrillation,
not PAT, and the proposed treatment only exacerbated the problem.
Dr. Osborn testified that had he received correct information, he
would have given different advice.

12

(R. 160.)

A reasonable

inference is that had Dr. Osborn personally examined his patient
rather than relying on the diagnosis of a non-cardiologist, he
would have discovered the decedent7s actual condition and would
have given correct advice.
The issue, therefore, is whether Dr. Osborn could and should
have personally examined the decedent.

Dr. Osborn testified the

reason he didn't was because he lacked staff privileges.

(R. 160.)

This excuse was contradicted by Dr. Bushnell's affidavit:
2.
I am a medical doctor, have been a
physician for 36 years (since 1955) and am
currently a physician specialist and consultant in emergency medicine.

7.
I am specialty qualified in Emergency Medicine. I am also board eligible in
Quality Assurance and Utilization Review.
(Please refer to submitted curriculum vitae.)
8.
I have reviewed the medical records
on Theodore James "Ted" Dikeou from the private practice of Jeffrey S. Osborn, M.D., and
from St. Mark's Hospital Emergency Room for
the treatment rendered to Ted Dikeou on the
night of February 20-21, 1990.
9.
I have also read transcripts of the
depositions of Mrs. Helen Dikeou, Dr. Jeffrey
S. Osborn and Dr. Michael D. Dowdall.
10. Having read and studied the documents listed above, I have formed a professional opinion as to the standard of medical
care applicable in this case and whether
Doctors Osborn and Dowdall adhered to that
standard of care in their treatment of Ted
Dikeou.
11. Jeffrey S. Osborn, M.D., was Ted
Dikeou's personal physician, and as such, was
the physician best informed as to Ted Dikeou's
13

heart condition, his general health and medical history.
12. Twice during the evening of February
20-21, 1990, before his arrival at St. Mark's
Hospital, Ted Dikeou had phoned Dr. Osborn
regarding his rapid heart rate.
By Dr.
Osborn's own deposition testimony, this is the
first
time
Ted's
Wolff-Parkinson-White
Syndrome had manifested itself over a prolonged period, as all prior incidents had been
of short duration and resolved spontaneously
with rest.

13. Dr. Osborn was aware of the unique
nature of this occurrence,
and by his own
testimony noted that this prolonged
episode
warranted further testing, f investigation
and
treatment
of Ted Dikeou s prolonged
tachycardia — a presentation
made gravely ominous
by Ted's known diagnosis of
Wolff-ParkinsonWhite syndrome.
This is the standard of
medical care which applies
to Dr.
Jeffrey
Osborn.
14. Dr. Osborn was aware of Ted Dikeou's
asthma and was informed by Ted Dikeou that he
had taken asthma medication earlier that
evening.
Dr. Osborn was also aware of the
specific medications which Ted Dikeou took and
was aware that these medications can trigger a
rapid heart beat as well as cause irregularities in the cardiac rhythm, which would be
especially significant for someone with WolffParkinson-White Syndrome.

15. Despite his professional
relationship with Ted Dikeou and his awareness that
further action on his part was required,
Dr.
Osborn failed to appreciate the seriousness
of
this occurrence,
failed
to investigate
the
change in his patient's
symptoms, failed
to
recommend that Ted Dikeou meet him at the
hospital where Dr. Osborn has staff
privileges
and in general,
failed
to respond in any
manner to his patient's
condition.
16. Once Ted Dikeou arrived at St.
Mark's Hospital, Dr. Michael D. Dowdall began
treatment which was based on improper evalua14

tion of Ted Dikeou's heart monitor pattern,
which treatment, rather than relieving Ted's
symptoms, exacerbated them.
17. Dr. Dowdall phoned Dr. Osborn for
his expertise and advice in dealing with Ted
Dikeou's heart condition. In his deposition,
Dr. Dowdall testified that he had confidence
in Dr. Osborn's advice.
18. At the time of Dr. Dowdall's
phone
call,
Dr. Osborn was put on further
notice
that his patient,
Ted Dikeou, was
continuing
to have a rapid heart beat, even after Ted had
received
one dose of verapamil
intravenously.
This indicated an even longer period of unresolved medically serious rapid ventricular
heart rate associated with his WolffParkinson-White Syndrome. Again Dr. Osborn
failed
to respond by going to the
emergency
room to confirm or modify Dr. Dowdallfs
monitor diagnosis.
Dr. Osborne [sic] should have
known now, if not before, that aspects of this
medical problem were inconsistent and required
a reevaluation by Dr. Osborne [sic] in person.
Dr. Osborne [sic]
could have requested
that
Ted be
transferred
to
a
hospital
of
Dr.
Osbornfs
choice
or that
Dr. Dowdall
seek
guidance from the cardiologist
on call at St.
Mark's Hospital
immediately
and before
ordering or agreeing to additional
therapy.
19. Dr. Osborn suggested the administration of medication to Ted Dikeou that night
without confirming the condition for which he
was prescribing, thereby playing a major role
in the exacerbation of Ted's condition and his
subsequent cardiac arrest, coma and death.
20.
As a physician
specialist
in emergency medicine,
I am aware of the
relationship
between emergency physicians
and other
doctors
who do and do not have hospital
privileges
at
a particular
facility.
21.
Dr. Osborn has stated
he did
not
come to St. Mark's Hospital because he did not
have staff
privileges
there.
In my
experience, Dr. Osborn would undoubtedly
have been
granted courtesy hospital
privileges
if he had
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presented himself at St. Mark's Hospital
assist
or consult in the treatment
of

to
his

patient,
Ted Dikeou.
In fact, a few days
later, by Dr. Osborn's deposition testimony,
he did appear at St. Mark,s Hospital and was
permitted to check on Ted Dikeou and review
his medical records. Another method is frequently used in the emergency department to
surmount the problem of participation by a
physician who does not have pre-approval of
hospital privileges. It is for the emergency
physician to consult with any physician who
comes to the hospital and together they can
decide about a patient. The resulting decisions and therapy are then implemented by the
emergency physicians orders.
•

• • •

23. In my professional opinion, both Dr.
Jeffrey S. Osborn and Dr. Michael D. Dowdall
were negligent in their treatment of Ted
Dikeou and failed to meet the applicable
standards of medical care.
(R. 232-36) (italics added).
In summary, the issue in this case was whether Dr. Osborn
could and should have made a personal examination and diagnosis of
the decedent's

condition,

rather than relying

solely

on the

diagnosis of the emergency room physician. The issue concerns the
relationship between a primary care physician and the emergency
room physician.

The issue also concerns whether Dr. Osborn could

have provided a personal examination where he did not have staff
privileges. The issue of Dr. Osborn's practice in the area of his
specialty is of only secondary concern, because Dr. Osborn himself
admitted that further testing was necessary and had he received
correct information he would have given different advice.
these matters were within the professional
16

expertise

All

of Dr.

Bushnell.2

The

trial

court erred

in striking

Dr.

Bushnell's

affidavit and in granting summary judgment to Dr. Osborn.
POINT II
THE TECHNICAL NONCOMPLIANCE WITH RULE 4-501
DID NOT WARRANT DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFFS7 CASE.
Defendant argued below and the trial court held that plaintiffs had

admitted

away

their

case by

failing

to respond

to

defendant's factual assertions using the precise format specified
by Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration.

The

relevant portions of the rule state:
(2) Motions for summary judgment.
(a) Memorandum in support of a motion.
The points and authorities in support of a
motion for summary judgment shall begin with a
section that contains a concise statement of
material facts as to which movant contends no
genuine issue exists. The facts shall be
stated in separate numbered sentences and
shall specifically refer to those portions of
the record upon which the movant relies.
(b) Memorandum in opposition to a motion. The points and authorities in opposition
to a motion for summary judgment shall begin
with a section that contains a concise statement of material facts as to which the party
2

Even if this Court were to conclude that there was some
technical defect in Dr. Bushnell's description of his familiarity
with the applicable standard of care, this Court should hold that
a reasonable inference from the description given is that Dr.
Bushnell did have the requisite familiarity. At trial, if a party
object to testimony for lack of foundation, the witness can give
further testimony to cure the defect. The same flexibility is not
available with an affidavit.
It is extremely difficult to
anticipate every conceivable objection to an affidavit. This Court
should rule that reasonable inferences should be drawn from
foundational testimony the same as from substantive testimony.
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contends a genuine issue exists. Each disputed
fact shall be stated in separate numbered
sentences and shall specifically refer to
those portions of the record upon which the
opposing party relies, and, if applicable,
shall state the numbered sentence or sentences
of the movants facts that are disputed. All
material facts set forth in the movant7s
statement and properly supported by an accurate reference to the record shall be deemed
admitted for the purpose of summary judgment
unless specifically controverted by the opposing party's statement.
This rule must be read in light of Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c),
which permits granting summary judgment only "if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law."

In this case, the depositions,

interrogatory answers, and affidavits did reveal issues of fact,
including whether Dr. Osborn could have treated Ted Dikeou at St.
Mark/s, whether Dr. Osborn made a reasonable effort to determine if
Dr. Dowdall's diagnosis of PAT was accurate, whether Dr. Osborn
should have been altered to the inaccuracy of the diagnosis because
the medication given was not having the desired effect, and the
ultimate issue of whether Dr. Osborn was negligent.

Plaintiffs'

entire memorandum opposing summary judgment was devoted to showing
that Dr. Osborn's factual assertions were controverted.
Utah R. Civ. P. 1(a) requires that the rules be construed to
promote

justice,

recognized.

a concept

the Utah

Supreme

Court

has long

Thomas J. Peck & Sons, Inc. v. Lee Rock Products.
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Inc.. 30 Utah 2d 187, 515 P.2d 446, 449-50 (1973) ("The pleadings
are never more important than the cause that is before the court .
. ..")

It is apparent from the trial court's ruling that it in

fact decided the case on the merits, and that the comments
concerning the failure to satisfy Rule 4-501 were make-weight. It
would have been an abuse of discretion to have decided the case
solely on the procedural failure where the facts were obviously
disputed.

If the trial court's ruling is based on the technical

defect, the judgment must be reversed.
POINT III
BOLSTERING THE RECORD AFTER THE DECISION ON
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS IMPROPER.
The trial

court

granted

defendant's

motion

for

summary

judgment by minute entry dated April 22, 1992. On April 29, 1992,
defendant made a motion to bolster the record by adding plaintiffs'
answers to two different sets of interrogatories.
granted the motion by order entered May 8, 1992.

The court

The order was

procedurally and substantively improper.
The order was procedurally improper because the court ruled
before plaintiffs had an opportunity to respond.

The motion was

served by hand delivery on May 1, 1992. Pursuant to Rule 4-501 of
the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, plaintiffs had ten days,
until May 11, to respond.

The trial court had already granted the

motion before plaintiffs' response was due. Also violated was Rule
4-504 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, which prohibits
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proposed

orders from being

submitted

to the judge prior to

submission to opposing counsel.
The order was substantively improper because Utah R. Civ. P.
56(c) requires that a ruling on summary judgment be based on the
documents on file at the time of the ruling. This is inappropriate
because on review of the trial court7s decision, the appellate
court should consider only the record that was before the trial
court at the time of its decision.

Olson v. Park-Craicr-Olson,

Inc., 815 P.2d 1356, 1359 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).

See also Reserve

Insurance Co. v. Pisciotta, 640 P.2d 764 (Cal. 1982); Moore v.
Pacific Northwest Bell, 662 P.2d 398 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983)

("A

court reviewing a dismissal on summary judgment is confined to
examining the record properly before the trial court.")
addition, the Utah Supreme Court has recognized that

lf

In

[g]enerally,

issues raised for the first time in post-judgment motions are
raised too late to be reviewed on appeal."

Franklin Financial v.

New Empire Development Co., 659 P.2d 1040 (Utah 1983).
The trial court's decision should be judged solely by the
documents which were before the court at the time of decision.
Allowing either side to supplement the record after decision would
be bad policy.

The order enlarging the record should be vacated.
CONCLUSION

Although

defendant

Dr.

Osborn

was

a

cardiologist,

his

negligence revolved around his interaction with the emergency room
physician, rather than the practice of his specialty per se.
20

Plaintiffs7 expert, Dr. Bushnell, was an eminent emergency room
physician and fully competent to testify concerning Dr. Osborn,s
negligence.

The summary judgment should be reversed, the order

enlarging the record vacated, and the matter remanded for trial.
DATED this _J_

day of May, 1993.

JACKSON HOWARD and
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the
foregoing were mailed to the following, postage prepaid, this
Z ? ^ 3 ^ day of May, 1993.
David H. Epperson, Esq.
Jaryl L. Rencher, Esq.
Hanson, Epperson & Smith
4 Triad Center, Suite 500
P. 0. Box 2970
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2970
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JACKSON HOWARD (1548) and
FRED D. HOWARD (1547), for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
120 East 300 North Street
P.O. Box 778
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-6345
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991

Our File No. 19,899
q:bushnell.aff

Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JAMES T. DIKEOU and HELEN K.
DIKEOU, individually and as the
natural parents and heirs of the
estate of THEODORE "TED" JAMES
DIKEOU, deceased,
Plaintiffs,

:
:

AFFIDAVIT OF
J. FRED BUSHNELL, MX).

:
:

vs.
MICHAEL D. DOWDALL, M.D.,
JEFFREY S. OSBORN, M.D., and
HCA HEALTH SERVICES OF UTAH,
INC., d/b/aST, MARK'S
HOSPITAL,

:

Defendants.

:

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF ORANGE

:

Civil No. 919004651CV
Judge: Richard H. Moffat

:

)
• ss
)

J. Fred Bushnell, M.D., being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows:
1.

I live in Laguna Niguel, California.

2.

I am a medical doctor, have been a physician for 36 years (since 1955) and am

currently a physician specialist and consultant in emergency medicine.

3.

In 1951, I graduated from Brigham Young University with a Bachelor of Arts

degree in mathematics.
4.

Following my undergraduate college studies I attended Stanford University

medical school, where I graduated in 1955.
5.

I completed a surgical internship at George Washington University Hospital,

Washington, D.C. in 1956.
6.

My medical post graduate training includes academic residencies and fellowships

at George Washington University Hospital (General Surgery) and University of California, Los
Angeles (Surgical Oncology followed by Diagnostic Radiology).
7.

I am specialty qualified in Emergency Medicine. I am also board eligible in

Quality Assurance and Utilization Review. (Please refer to submitted curriculum vitae.)
8.

I have reviewed the medical records on Theodore James "Ted" Dikeou from the

private practice of Jeffrey S. Osborn, M.D., and from St. Mark's Hospital Emergency Room
for the treatment rendered to Ted Dikeou on the night of February 20-21, 1990.
9.

I have also read transcripts of the depositions of Mrs. Helen Dikeou, Dr. Jeffrey

S. Osborn and Dr. Michael D. Dowdall.
10.

Having read and studied the documents listed above, I have formed a

professional opinion as to the standard of medical care applicable in this case and whether
Doctors Osborn and Dowdall adhered to that standard of care in their treatment of Ted
Dikeou.
11.

Jeffrey S. Osborn, M.D., was Ted Dikeou's personal physician, and as such, was

the physician best informed as to Ted Dikeou's heart condition, his general health and
medical history.
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12.

Twice during the evening of February 20-21, 1990, before his arrival at St.

Mark's Hospital, Ted Dikeou had phoned Dr. Osbom regarding his rapid heart rate. By Dr.
Osborn's own deposition testimony, this is the first time Ted's Wolff-Parkinson-White
Syndrome had manifested itself over a prolonged period, as all prior incidents had been of
short duration and resolved spontaneously with rest.
13.

Dr. Osbom was aware of the unique nature of this occurrence, and by his own

testimony noted that this prolonged episode warranted further testing, investigation and
treatment of Ted Dikeou's prolonged tachycardia - a presentation made gravely ominous by
Ted's known diagnosis of Wolff-Parkinson-White syndrome. This is the standard of medical
care which applies to Dr. Jeffrey Osbom.
14.

Dr. Osbom was aware of Ted Dikeou's asthma and was informed by Ted

Dikeou that he had taken asthma medication earlier that evening.

Dr. Osbom was also

aware of the specific medications which Ted Dikeou took and was aware that these
medications can trigger a rapid heart beat as well as cause irregularities in the cardiac rhythm,
which would be especially significant for someone with Wolff-Parkinson-White Syndrome.
15.

Despite his professional relationship with Ted Dikeou and his awareness that

further action on his part was required, Dr. Osbom failed to appreciate the seriousness of
this occurrence, failed to investigate the change in his patient's symptoms, failed to
recommend that Ted Dikeou meet him at the hospital where Dr. Osbom has staff privileges
and in general, failed to respond in any manner to his patient's condition.
16.

Once Ted Dikeou arrived at St. Mark's Hospital, Dr. Michael D. Dowdall began

treatment which was based on improper evaluation of Ted Dikeou's heart monitor pattern,
which treatment, rather than relieving Ted's symptoms, exacerbated them.
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17.

Dr. Dowdall phoned Dr. Osborn for his expertise and advice in dealing with Ted

Dikeou's heart condition. In his deposition, Dr. Dowdall testified that he had confidence in
Dr. Osborn's advice.
18.

At the time of Dr. Dowdall's phone call, Dr. Osborn was put on further notice

that his patient, Ted Dikeou, was continuing to have a rapid heart beat, even after Ted had
received one dose of verapamil intravenously. This indicated an even longer period of
unresolved medically serious rapid ventricular heart rate associated with his Wolff-ParkinsonWhite Syndrome. Again Dr. Osborn failed to respond by going to the emergency room to
confirm or modify Dr. Dowdall's monitor diagnosis. Dr. Osborne should have known now,
if not before, that aspects of this medical problem were inconsistent and required a
reevaluation by Dr. Osborne in person. Dr. Osborne could have requested that Ted be
transferred to a hospital of Dr. Osborn's choice or that Dr. Dowdall seek guidance from the
cardiologist on call at St. Mark's Hospital immediately and before ordering or agreeing to
additional therapy.
19.

Dr. Osborn suggested the administration of medication to Ted Dikeou that night

without confirming the condition for which he was prescribing, thereby playing a major role
in the exacerbation of Ted's condition and his subsequent cardiac arrest, coma and death.
20.

As a physician specialist in emergency medicine, I am aware of the relationship

between emergency physicians and other doctors who do and do not have hospital privileges
at a particular facility.
21.

Dr. Osborn has stated he did not come to St. Mark's Hospital because he did

not have staff privileges there. In my experience, Dr. Osborn would undoubtedly have been
granted courtesy hospital privileges if he had presented himself at St. Mark's Hospital to assist
or consult in the treatment of his patient, Ted Dikeou. In fact, a few days later, by Dr.
4
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Osborn's deposition testimony, he did appear at St. Mark's Hospital and was permitted to
check on Ted Dikeou and review his medical records. Another method is frequently used in
the emergency department to surmount the problem of participation by a physician who does
not have pre-approval of hospital privileges. It is for the emergency physician to consult with
any physician who comes to the hospital and together they can decide about a patient. The
resulting decisions and therapy are then implemented by the emergency physician's orders.
22.

Dr. Dowdall also failed to meet the applicable standard of medical care in his

diagnosis and treatment of Ted Dikeou. Dr. Dowdall made a mistake and failed to read
Ted's cardiac pattern correctly, misinformed Dr. Osborn of the nature of the monitor pattern
and administered to Ted Dikeou inappropriate medications which not only failed to relieve
his problem, but which caused further sensitization of Ted Dikeou's heart, leading to his
cardiac arrest, coma and death.
23.

In my professional opinion, both Dr. Jeffrey S. Osborn and Dr. Michael D.

Dowdall were negligent in their treatment of Ted Dikeou and failed to meet the applicable
standards of medical care.

DATED this 20th day of March, 1992.

JVFRED BUSHNELL, M.D.

SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this

day of

, 1992.

NOTARY PUBLIC
5
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Sworn and verified to me by telephone communication this %to day of March, 1992,
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 69-1-2, and I therefore attach my seal as Notary Public.

DTARY PUBLIC
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CURRICULUM VITAE
PERSONAL INFORMATION

J. FRED BUSHNELL. M. D.
13 Parkman Road
Laguna Niguel, California 92677-4115
(714) 496-5112 Fax 248-7120

Telephones
Date of Birth
Place of Birth

August 4,1928
Meadow, Utah, USA

EDUCATION
1941 -1945

GRADUATE Provo High School, Provo, Utah.

1945-1951

B.A. DEGREE Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah.
Major Mathematics, Minor English.

1951 -1955

M.D. DEGREE Stanford University School of Medicine, Stanford,
California 94305.

1955-1956

INTERNSHIP IN SURGERY George Washington University Hospital,
Washington, D.C.

1956-1957

RESIDENT IN GENERAL SURGERY George Washington University
Hospital, Washington, D.C.

1962

SURGICAL GRADUATE RESEARCH FELLOW Cancer
Chemotherapy, UCLA Medical Center, Los Angeles, California.

1962-1963

RESIDENT IN DIAGNOSTIC RADIOLOGY, U C U Medical Center, Los
Angeles, California.

HONORS
Dean's List Honors Brigham Young University.
Newell Scholar four years at Stanford.
Newhouse Scholar three years at Stanford.
LANGUAGES
ARABIC - spoken in social and medical situations.
ENGLISH - native language with advanced study.
GERMAN - two years university level study.
ITALIAN - basics for social dialogue.
MEDICAL LATIN and MEDICAL GREEK - basic study.
SPANISH - fluent with correct grammar, both verbal and written.
SPECIAL SEMINARS
1973 -1974

STAT Seminars To Assist Teachers for graduate physicians entering
teaching. Created by the Graduate Research Division in Education,

use.

ACTIVITIES
1962-1963

SURGICAL GRADUATE RESEARCH FELLOW Cancer
Chemotherapy, UCLA. The cancer research project was part of a
nationwide protocol designed to determine whether the combination
of radiation therapy and radiomimetic chemotherapy drugs given
concurrently would have a synergistic effect. Funded by U.S. Public
Health Service Grant Number CYF - 6105.
With two other surgery specialists we operated the Advanced Breast
Tumor Clinic and the Surgical Cancer Chemotherapy Clinic. We were
consultants in cancer for the UCLA Medical Center.

1973 -1974

USC RESEARCH PROGRAMS
QUALITY OF EMERGENCY CARE ASSESSMENT I was a principle
member of the organization team to develop a protocol and obtain
grant money for a study named: A Project to Evaluate the Affect on
Quality of Emergency Medical Care by the creation and use of a super
paramedic or EMT III as part of a soecial emergency medical team.
HEW Contract Number 110-71-119.
APOMORPHINE-NALOXONE STUDY Researched, developed and
obtained approval to test a protocol for an apomorphine naloxone
study in the Department of Emergency Medicine. This was effeaive in
treating overdose patients.
HYPERTENSION SCREENING PROJECT I was responsible for the
work assignments of fifty Physician Assistant trainees. Organized a
program for them to find and treat the asymptomatic hypertensive
patients among the more than one thousand patients seen daily in the
Emergency Department. This project was chosen as a scientific
exhibit for the AMA convention in Chicago, June 1974.
HOSPITAL EMERGENCY SERVICES AUDIT I was the physician
from Los Angeles County for this project: An Audit of Hospital
Emergency Departments .conducted by California Hospital Association
through Hospital Councifof Southern California. Funded by a grant
from Regional Medical Programs Contract RMP -73-15 (E) - 146M.

PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS:
Salt Lake County Medical Society.
Los Angeles County Medical Society.
Foundation for Emergency Medical Education, Inc. Director.
CHARTER MEMBER American College Emergency Physicians.
Board Of Directors of California Chapter.
CHAIRMAN Research and Publication Committee.
Socio-Economic Committee
Hospital and Contracts Committee
Ethics Committee
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NATIONAL COUNSELOR representing the California Chapter of the
American College of Emergency Physicians.
NATIONAL CONSULTANT IN EMERGENCY MEDICINE designated
by the California Chapter of the American College of Emergency
Physicians.
PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND
1959-1961

HEBER CITY, UTAH. Private practice partnership. Associated with a
General Surgeon and a General Practitioner

1964-1973

LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA.
Private practice solo. Emphasis on surgical management of major
trauma victims, oncology patients and cancer chemotherapy. Practice
later limited to the acute surgical management of major trauma
patients.
Participated as part time staff for emergency services at Holy Cross
Hospital, San Fernando, California; Riverside Hospital, North
Hollywood, California, St.Frances Hospital, Lynnwood, California;
Paramount General Hospital, Paramount, California; St. Joseph
Hospital, Burbank, California.
TUMOR BOARD
Holy Cross Hospital, San Fernando, California.
St. Joseph Hospital, Burbank, California.

1973 -1974

LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA. PHYSICIAN SPECIALIST
EMERGENCY MEDICINE. Department of Emergency Medicine, Los
Angeles County University of Southern California Medical Center.
CLINICAL INSTRUCTOR OF EMERGENCY MEDICINE LAC - USC
Medical Center. Responsible for clinical and didactic teaching of
medical students, nurses, interns, residents, and paramedics.
CLINICAL COORDINATOR primarily responsible for the work
assignments and both clinical and didactic instruction of Physician
Assistant trainees in the Department of Emergency Medicine.
EXECUTIVE STAFF IN THE ACADEMIC DEPARTMENT OF
EMERGENCY MEDICINE. Los Angeles County University of
Southern California Medical Center.
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HEAD PHYSICIAN. Main Emergency Department, Los Angeles
County USC Medical Center.
The Head Physician work position is unique. It requires conspicuous
clinical performance plus total administrative responsibility for the
thirty physicians providing care within the Emergency Department.
The position includes other duties besides teaching and the efficient
function of the emergency service. On the evening and night shifts
THE HEAD PHYSICIAN has authority as acting medical director for ail
of the two thousand bed four hospital medical complex.
It requires a physician capable of making prompt decisions and
prepared to make rapid diagnosis. The physician uses triage by
priority of need, and treats or dispositions the patients. The position is
designed to teach by example the inherent differences in medical
thinking needed by an emergency physician.
COMMITTEES LAC - USC MEDICAL CENTER
EXECUTIVE STAFF Committee Emergency Department
Research Committee.
Peer Review Committee.
Education Committee - Library Committee.
Disaster Planning Committee, Senior Medical Operations Officer.
Quality Assessment Committee
Medical Care Evaluation Committee
Chart Review Committee.
Death Review Committee.
EMERGENCY MEDICINE REVIEW COMMITTEE for Los Angeles
County Task Force to inspect and evaluate seventy-five hospitals
applying for a County Emergency Aid Plan contract.
1975

PARAMOUNT, CALIFORNIA. DIRECTOR OF EMERGENCY
DEPARTMENT and Paramedic Base Station Radio Operation.
CHAIRMAN Emergency Services Committee.
CHAIRMAN Regional Joint Paramedic Committee for Southeast Los
Angeles County.

1976

NORWALK, CALIFORNIA. Director Emergency Department
Norwalk Community Hospital.

1976 - 1977

RIVERSIDE, CALIFORNIA. RIVERSIDE COUNTY GENERAL
HOSPITAL. Recruited to upgrade the emergency services to
Departmental Status and to begin full time staffing by a group of
Physician Specialists in Emergency Medicine. Teaching programs
were organized for the house staff who rotated there from Loma Linda
University Medical Center.
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1977-1978

PASADENA, CALIFORNIA. Huntington Memorial Hospital. Six
months full time consultation to evaluate feasibility of starting a
residency program in Emergency Medicine.

1977

LIHUE, KAUAI, HAWAII. G.N. WILCOX HOSPITAL EMERGENCY
DEPARTMENT. Site evaluation to organize and improve the quality of
their emergency services. Invited to join the Emergency Department
staff of Kauai Medical Group at G.N. Wilcox Hospital in November
1977. (Previous locum tenens in June 1976 and June 1977.)

1977

NATIONAL BOARD EXAMINATION written as required by the State of
Hawaii to obtain a permanent Hawaiian License. State of Hawaii
Medical License Number 03325.

1978 -1980

MISSION VIEJO, CALIFORNIA. MISSION COMMUNITY HOSPITAL
Full time staff Emergency Department.
MISSION COMMUNITY HOSPITAL ACTIVITIES
Certified as INSTRUCTOR in Advanced Cardiac Life Support
(ACLS). In-service teaching of Paramedics and MICU nurses to
bolster support to retain the Paramedic Base Station Radio. Assisted
in audit of Paramedic receiving hospitals to select regional trauma
centers for Orange County.
Family Practice Committee.
Core Committee Family Practice.
Emergency Services Committee.
Regional Paramedic Committee.
CHAIRMAN Safety and Sanitation Committee.
CHAIRMAN Disaster Planning Committee.
EXECUTIVE MEDICAL STAFF COMMITTEE.

1978

RIYADH, SAUDI ARABIA. Consultation for International Medical
Services, a private firm treating Western expatriate workers.
November-December 1978.

1980 -1983

TAIF, SAUDI ARABIA. Director of Emergency Department and
Chief of Ambulatory Services Al Hada Hospital for the Ministry of
Defense and Aviation. I was the Senior Medical Officer for this two
billion dollar project to create a U.S. style tertiary referral and teaching
medical complex in Taif, Saudi Arabia.
Add on: Responsible for all medical disaster preparations for the
third Pan Islamic Conference that hosted forty nation delegations in
Taif. Spring 1981. Additional two billion dollar budget.

1983

QUEBEC. CANADA. Organized CANADA HEALTH SYSTEMS for
Quebec, in association with John Bowen, President of NME
International. This unique consortium of ten private firms joined with
the Quebec government to export their health care industry.
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1983

LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA Again with John Bowent we prepared
a business plan for a Network of Central City Instant Care Centers and
plans for international expansion Presented to Mr Richard Earner,
President and Chairman of National Medical Enterprises.

1984-1985

CERRITOS, CALIFORNIA. Physician staff in start up of Cerntos
Instant Care a National Medical Enterpnses Instant Care Center.

1985 -1988

ORANGE, CALIFORNIA. MEDICAL DIRECTOR FOR THE ADMAR
GROUP, INC. Admar's health programs include a nation wide PPO,
TPA service and a nation wide propnetary Medical Utilization Review
program After three years as medical director this qualified me to
write the board examination in the new speciality of QUALITY
ASSURANCE AND UTILIZATION REVIEW (see addendum).

1988

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY Team member
forming a PPO for employee health plan Worked in five SCE clinics to
prepare QA evaluation.

1989

TEGUCIGALPA, HONDURUS. International Medical Corns, under
contract with US State Department A I D , classified SECRET, requires
security clearance.

1989

BUSHNELL RESEARCH ASSOCIATES formed Consultants in
Medical Informatics for clinical medical practice Includes medical and
technical writing Two edited medical books published.

1991

SOUTH COUNTY COMMUNITY CLINIC. San Juan Capistrano,
California
On clinical staff and several committees, also as CONSULTANT.
1) MEDICAL QUALITY ASSURANCE
2) COMPUTERIZED MEDICAL INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT
Identifying information fields for capture, storage and
retrieval on Local Area Network (LAN).
Installing real time links with wide area networks for
medical information retneval system, eg direct tie to
National Library of Medicine. (Requires training staff includes 31 physician volunteers - in connection and
search protocols.)
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JAMES T. DIKEOU and HELEN K.
DIKEO, individuallyand as the
natural parents and heirs of
the estate of THEODORE "TED"
JAMES DIKEO, deceased,
Plaintiffs,

:

MINUTE ENTRY

:

Case No. 910904651 CV

:

JUDGE RICHARD H. MOFFAT

:

vs.

:

MICHAEL D. DOWDALL, M.D.,
JEFFREY S. OSBORN, and HCA
HEALTH SERVICES OF UTAH,
d/b/a ST. MARKS HOSPITAL,

:
:

Defendants.

The Court having considered the Motion for Summary Judgment
and the memorandum and affidavits in support and in opposition
thereto together with the Motion to Strike the Affidavit of J.
Fred Bushnell, M.D. and the Memorandum in Support thereof and
now being fully advised in the premises makes this its:
MINUTE ENTRY
The Motion for Summary Judgment in favor of the defendant
Jeffrey S. Osborn, M.D. is hereby granted.

The Court is of the

nnn?R7

DIKEOU V. DOWDALL

PAGE 2

MINUTE ENTRY

opinion for the reasons, inter alia, set forth in the Memorandum
in Support of said Motion and the Joint Reply Memorandum in
Support

thereof

that

the

plaintiffs

have,

by

the

record,

patently admitted that they have no expert to provide testimony
necessary to show that Dr. Osborn's involvment in the treatment
of the decedant (there being no actual treatment by Dr. Osborn
on the night that the damage to the decedant's heart occured)
did not rise to the standard required under Utah Law.

In an

attempt to satisfy this short coming after the filing of the
Motion the plaintiffs filed the affidavit of J. Fred Bushnell,
M.D..

An examination of that affidavit clearly indicates that

Dr. Bushnell is not an expert in the same area of practice as
Dr.

Osborn.

reveals a
hearsay.

Further

lack

of

an

examination

foundation and

of his

is also

opinion
clearly

clearly
based

on

Even given a presumption of the ability to rely on

hearsay to an expert's testimony said affidavit does not meet
the criteria required to enable him to be able to testify as to
the standard of the care reqquired for a physician specializing
in the same specialty as Dr. Osborn.
Bushnell's

affidavit

Another deficiency of Dr.

is that as to most

of

the content of

paragraphs 11 through 23 the statements are based on speculation
and further do not state the evidence as it appears from the
record.

Therefore,

the

Motion

Affidavit is therefore granted.

to

Strike

Dr.

Bushnell's

In addition/ it should be noted
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that the claim of allegations of fact being extant simply is not
supported by the record.

The memorandum of the defendants does

not set forth the concise statement of the material issues of
fact that are genuinely

in issue as required by Rule

(2) (b) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration.

4-501
Further

there is not a statement of each disputed fact as required in a
separate numbered sentence nor are any of the facts specifically
converted by admissible evidence and in fact the record reveals
admission sufficient to support the Motion for Summary Judgment.
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Minute Entry, postage prepaid, to the following,
this

day of April, 1992:

Jackson Howard
Fred D. Howard
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSON
Attorney for Plaintiff
P. 0. Box 778
Provo, Utah 84 603
Philip F. Fishier
STRONG & HANNI
Attorney for Defendant Dowdall
Sixth Floor Boston Building
#9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
David H. Epperson
Jaryl L. Rencher
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH
Attorneys for Defendant Osborn
P. O. Box 2970
Salt Lake City, Utah
84110-2970
David W. Slagle
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorney for Defendant HCA Health Services
P. 0. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
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DAVID H. EPPERSON #1000
JARYL L. RENCHER #4903
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant,
Jeffrey S. Osborn
4 Triad Center, Suite 500
Post Office Box 2970
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970
(801) 363-7611
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JAMES T. DIKEOU and HELEN K.
DIKEOU, individually and as
the natural parents and heirs
of the estate of THEODORE
"TED" JAMES DIKEOU, deceased,

ORDER

Plaintiffs,
v.
Civil No. C91-4651

MICHAEL D. DOWDALL, M.D.,
JEFFREY S. OSBORN, and
HCA HEALTH SERVICES OF UTAH,
d/b/a ST. MARKS HOSPITAL,

Judge Richard H. Moffat

Defendants.
The Court having considered the motion of Jeffrey S. Osborn,
M.D., for filing of discovery responses and the fact that those
matters sought to be included in the record have been submitted by
plaintiffs themselves and finding good cause appearing therefor
hereby
ORDERS,
Dr. Osborn's

ADJUDGES

and

interrogatories

DECREES
with

plaintiffs7

attachment

answers

and

to

plaintiffs'

answers to interrogatories of defendant St. Marks Hospital are to
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filed by the clerk of the Court and made a part of the record in
this case*
DATED this

f

day of

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
document

was

mailed,

postage

prepaid,

this

*ty~

day

of

, 1992, to:
Attorneys for P l a i n t i f f s ;
J a c k s o n Howard, Esq.
Fred D. Howardl Esq.

, ., , j„ h * I z- / ©-A
Cfifr~J-cle/<»ere*t
±-f^)

Howard, Lewis & Petersen
120 East 300 North
Post Office Box 778
Provo, Utah 84603
Attorneys for Defendant, Michael D. Dowdall, M.D.;
Philip R. Fishier, Esq.
Strong & Hanni
Sixth Floor Boston Building
#9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Defendant, HCA Health Services of
Utah, Inc., dba St. Mark's Hospital;
David W. Slagle, Esq.
Snow, Christensen & Martineau
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
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MAY - 8 1992
DAVID H. EPPERSON #1000
JARYL L. RENCHER #4903
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant,
Jeffrey S. Osborn
4 Triad Center, Suite 500
Post Office Box 2970
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970
(801) 363-7611
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JAMES T. DIKEOU and HELEN K.
DIKEOU, individually and as
the natural parents and heirs
of the estate of THEODORE
"TED" JAMES DIKEOU, deceased,

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND ORDER

Plaintiffs,
v.
MICHAEL D. DOWDALL, M.D.,
JEFFREY S. OSBORN, and
HCA HEALTH SERVICES OF UTAH,
d/b/a ST. MARKS HOSPITAL,

Civil No. C91-4651
Judge Richard H. Moffat

Defendants.
The Court having considered the motion for summary judgment
filed by Jeffrey S. Osborn, M.D., and the memorandum, exhibits and
evidence in support thereof and the memorandum and affidavit
offered in opposition thereto, together with Dr. Jeffrey S*
Osborn's motion to strike the affidavit of J. Fred Bushnell, M.D.,
and the memoranda offered in support and opposition thereto, and
the Court having reviewed and considered the record in this case
(neither party having requested oral argument) and after being

000340

fully advised

in the premises and law and finding good and

sufficient cause therefor hereby enters its Judgment and Order:
1.

The Motion for Summary Judgment in favor of the defendant

Jeffrey S. Osbornf M.D. is granted.

The Court is of the opinion

for the reasons, inter alia, set forth in the Memorandum in Support
of said Motion and the Joint Reply Memorandum in Support thereof
and in support of Jeffrey S. Osborn, M.D.'s Motion to Strike the
Affidavit of J. Fred Bushnell, M.D., that the plaintiffs have, by
the record, patently admitted that they have no expert to provide
testimony necessary to show that Dr. Osborn's involvement in the
treatment of the decedent (there being no actual treatment by Dr.
Osborn on the night that the damage to the decedent's heart
occurred) did not rise to the standard required under Utah law in
order for plaintiffs to sustain their burden of proof.
2.

In an attempt to satisfy this shortcoming after the

filing of the Motion for Summary Judgment, the plaintiffs filed the
affidavit of J. Fred Bushnell, M.D.

An examination of that

affidavit clearly indicates that Dr. Bushnell is not an expert in
the same area of practice as Dr. Osborn.

Further, an examination

of his opinion clearly reveals a lack of foundation and is also
clearly based on hearsay. Even given a presumption of the ability
to rely on hearsay to an expert's testimony said affidavit does not
meet the criteria required to enable him to be able to testify as
to the standard of care required for a physician specializing in
the same specialty as Dr. Osborn.

Dr. Bushnell's affidavit is

further deficient in that most of the content and statements of

2
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paragraphs 11 through 23 are based on speculation and do not state
the

evidence

as

it

appears

from

the

record.

Accordingly,

Dr. Jeffrey S. Osborn's Motion to Strike Dr. Bushnell's Affidavit
is granted.
3.

In addition to the foregoing, the Court's rulings are

also based on the following grounds:
(a) Plaintiffs' claims in their memoranda of allegations
of fact being extant simply are not supported by the record.
(b)

Plaintiffs' memoranda do not set forth a concise

statement of material issues of fact that are genuinely in issue as
required

by

Rule

4-501(2) (b)

of

the

Utah

Code

of

Judicial

Administration.
(c)
not

offered

As required by this Court's rulesf plaintiffs have
a

statement

of

each disputed

fact

in a

separate

numbered sentence nor are any of the facts of record specifically
controverted by plaintiffs by admissible evidence; and in fact the
record reveals evidence and admissions sufficient to support the
Motion for Summary Judgment.
4.

Summary judgment is granted Dr. Osborn with prejudice.

5.

Dr. Osborn's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of J. Fred

Bushnell, M.D., is ljrkewise granted with prejudice^
DATED this

ff

day of

Rfc^ard H/MoKf^t
District to\rsM/Judged
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
document

was

lA

mailed,

postage

prepaid,

this

*j -

day

of

1992, to:
Attorneys for Plaintiffs:
Jackson Howard, Esq.
(fan J-defined
Fred D. Howard, Esq.
Howard, Lewis & Petersen
120 East 300 North
Post Office Box 778
Provo, Utah 84603
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Attorneys for Defendant, Michael D. Dowdall, M.D.:
Philip R. Fishier, Esq.
Strong & Hanni
Sixth Floor Boston Building
#9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Defendant, HCA Health Services of
Utah, Inc., dba St. Marias Hospital:
David W. Slagle, Esq.
Snow, Christensen & Martineau
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
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Philip R. Fishier, #1083
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Defendant,
Michael D. Dowdall, M.D.
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JAMES T. DIKEOU and HELEN K.
DIKEOU, individually and as the
natural parents and heirs of the
estate Of THEODORE 'TED' DIKEOU,
deceased,

STIPULATION AND ORDER FOR
DISMISSAL

Plaintiffs,
Civil NO. 910904651 CV

vs.
MICHAEL D. DOWDALL, M.D., HCA
HEALTH SERVICES OF UTAH dba ST.
MARK'S HOSPITAL,

Judge Richard H. Moffat
Defendants.
COMES NOW the plaintiffs and defendants in this case and by
and through counsel stipulate and agree that this case may be dismissed with prejudice, with the parties to bear their respective
costs. This stipulation and order of dismissal shall not prejudice
plaintiff's claims against Jeffrey s. Osborn, M.D., including any
rights of appeals, are hereby preserved.

T

DATED this / T a a y of July, 1992.
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN,

^
Jackson ^Howard
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

ooo3r>

STRONG & HANNI

By:
LiliiTRl RLshler
Attorneys
for
Defendant,
Michael D. Dowdall, M.D.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU,

David w.Slagle /
Attorneys for De(^enjiarit
HCA Health Services of Utah
d/b/a St. Mark's Hospital
ORDER FOR DISMISSAL
Based on the foregoing Stipulation of counsel and good
cause appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that pursuant to
the foregoing Stipulation, this matter be and the same is hereby
dismissed with prejudice, with the parties to bear their respective
costs.

This dismissal shall not prejudice plaintiff's claims

against Jeffrey s. Osborn, M.D. including plaintiff's right to
appeal any orders of the court heretofore entered against plaintiffs and in. favor of Jeffrey S. psbpprn, M.D.
DATED this Jj_

day of^^tf^«Ar^l992

oooarn

CERTIFICATION OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this jj^

day of July, 1992, a true

and correct copy of the foregoing document was mailed, postage
prepaid to:
Jackson Howard
Fred Howard
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
120 East 300 North Street
P. O. Box 778
Provo, Utah 84603
David W. slagle
Elizabeth King
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
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1544.732/307943
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CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION

Rule 4-408. Locations of trial courts of record.
Intent:
To designate locations of trial courts of record.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to all trial courts of record.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) Each county seat and the following municipalities are hereby designated as locations of trial courts
of record: American Fork; Bountiful; Cedar City;
Clearfield; Kaysville; Layton; Murray; Orem; Park
City; Roosevelt; Roy; Salem; Sandy; Spanish Fork;
West Valley City.
(2) Subject to limitations imposed by law. a trial
court of record of any subject matter jurisdiction may
hold court in any location designated by this rule.
(Added effective January 1, 1992.)
ARTICLE 5.
CIVIL PRACTICE.
Rule 4-501. Motions.
Intent:
To establish a uniform procedure for filing motions,
supporting memoranda and documents with the
court.
To establish a uniform procedure for requesting
and scheduling hearings on dispositive motions.
To establish a procedure for expedited dispositions.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to motion practice in all district and circuit courts except proceedings before the
court commissioners and the small claims department of the circuit court. This rule does not apply to
petitions for habeas corpus or other forms of extraordinary relief.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) Filing and service of motions and memoranda.
(a) Motion and supporting memoranda. All
motions, except uncontested or ex-parte matters,
shall be accompanied by a memorandum of
points and authorities appropriate affidavits, and
copies of or citations by page number to relevant
portions of depositions, exhibits or other documents relied upon in support of the motion. Memoranda supporting or opposing a motion shall not
exceed ten pages in length exclusive of the
"statement of material facts" as provided in paragraph (2), except as waived by order of the court
on ex-parte application. If an ex-parte application is made to file an over-length memorandum,
the application shall state the length of the principal memorandum, and if the memorandum is in
excess of ten pages, the application shall include
a summary of the memorandum, not to exceed
five pages.
(b» Memorandum in opposition to motion.
The responding party shall file and serve upon
all parties within ten days after service of a motion, a memorandum in opposition to the motion,
and all supporting documentation. If the responding party fails to file a memorandum in opposition to the motion within ten days after service of the motion, the moving party may notify
the clerk to submit the matter to the court for
decision as provided in paragraph (Did) of this
rule.
(c) Reply memorandum. The moving party
may serve and file a reply memorandum within
five days after service of the responding party's
memorandum.

Rule 4-501

(d) Notice to submit for decision. Upon the
expiration of the five-day period to file a reply
memorandum, either party may notify the Clerk
to submit the matter to the court for decision.
The notification shall be in the form of a separate
written pleading and captioned "Notice to Submit for Decision." The notification shall contain a
certificate of mailing to all parties. If neither
party files a notice, the motion will not be submitted for decision.
(2) Motions for summary judgment
(a) Memorandum in support of a motion.
The points and authorities in support of a motion
for summary judgment shall begin with a section
that contains a concise statement of material
facts as to which movant contends no genuine
issue exists. The facts shall be stated in separate
numbered sentences and shall specifically refer
to those portions of the record upon which the
movant relies.
(b) Memorandum in opposition to a motion. The points and authorities in opposition to
a motion for summary judgment shall begin with
a section that contains a concise statement of material facts as to which the party contends a genuine issue exists. Each disputed fact shall be
stated in separate numbered sentences and shall
specifically refer to those portions of the record
upon which the opposing party relies, and, if applicable, shall state the numbered sentence or
sentences of the movant's facts that are disputed.
All material facts set forth in the movant's statement and properly supported by an accurate reference to the record shall be deemed admitted for
the purpose of summary judgment unless specifically controverted by the opposing party's statement.
(3) Hearings.
(a) A decision on a motion shall be rendered
without a hearing unless ordered by the Court, or
requested by the parties as provided in paragraphs (3)(b) or (4) below.
(b) In cases where the granting of a motion
would dispose of the action or any issues in the
action on the merits with prejudice, either party
at the time of filing the principal memorandum
in support of or in opposition to a motion may file
a written request for a hearing.
(c) Such request shall be granted unless the
court finds that (a) the motion or opposition to
the motion is frivolous or (b) that the dispositive
issue or set of issues governing the granting or
denial of the motion has been authoritatively decided.
(d) When a request for hearing is denied, the
court shall notify the requesting party. When a
request for hearing is granted, the court shall set
the matter for hearing or notify the requesting
party that the matter shall be heard and the requesting party shall schedule the matter for
hearing and notify all parties of the date and
time,
(e) In those cases where a hearing is granted, a
courtesy copy of the motion, memorandum of
points and authorities and all documents supporting or opposing the motion shall be delivered
to the judge hearing the matter at least two
working days before the date set for hearing.
Copies shall be clearly marked as courtesy copies
and indicate the date and time of the hearing.
Courtesy copies shall not be filed with the clerk
of the court.

Kule 4-6U2
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(f) If no written request for a hearing is made
at the time the parties file their principal memoranda, a hearing on the motion shall be deemed
waived.
(g) All dispositive motions shall be heard at
least thirty (30) days before the scheduled trial
date. No dispositive motions shall be heard after
that date without leave of the Court.
(4) Expedited dispositions. Upon motion and notice and for good cause shown, the court may grant a
request for an expedited disposition in any case
where time is of the essence and compliance with the
provisions of this rule would be impracticable or
where the motion does not raise significant legal issues and could be resolved summarily.
(5) Telephone conference. The court on its own
motion or at a party's request may direct arguments
of any motion by telephone conference without court
appearance. A verbatim record shall be made of all
telephone arguments and the rulings thereon if requested by counsel.
(Amended effective January 15, 1990; April 15,
1991.)
Rule 4-502. Discovery procedures in civil cases.
Intent:
To establish a procedure for the filing of discovery
documents.
To establish a limitation on discovery procedures
within 30 days of trial.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to the District, Juvenile and
Circuit Courts.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) Parties conducting discovery under Rules 33,
34 and 36 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure shall
not file discovery requests with the clerk of the court,
but shall file only the original certificate of service
stating that the discovery requests have been served
on the other parties and the date of service. The responding party shall file a similar certificate with the
clerk of the court.
(2) The party serving the discovery request shall
retain the original with a copy of the proof of service
affixed to it and serve a copy of the discovery request
and proof of service upon the opposing party or counsel. The party responding to the discovery request
shall retain the original with a copy of the proof of
service affixed to it, and serve a copy of the responses
and the proof of service upon the opposing party or
counsel. The discovery requests and response shall
not be filed with the clerk of the court unless the
court on motion and notice and for good cause shown
so orders.
(3) Any party filing a motion to compel compliance
with a discovery request or a motion which relies
upon the discovery response shall attach a copy of the
discovery request or response which is at issue in the
motion.
(4) Depositions taken pursuant to the Rules of
Civil Procedure shall not be filed with the clerk of the
court except as provided in this Code or upon order of
the court for good cause shown.
(5) All parties shall be entitled to conduct discovery proceedings in accordance with this rule. All discovery proceedings shall be completed, including all
responses thereto, and all depositions and other documents filed with the court no later than thirty (30)
days before the date set for trial of the case. The right
to conduct discovery proceedings within thirty (30)
days before trial shall be within the discretion of the
court. Motions to conduct discovery within thirty (30)
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days before trial shall be presented to the judge assigned to the case upon notice to the other parties in
the action. In exercising its discretion, the court shall
take into consideration the necessity and reasons for
such discovery, the diligence or lack of diligence of
the parties seeking such discovery, whether permitting such discovery will prevent the case from going
to trial on the scheduled date, or result in prejudice to
any party. Nothing herein shall preclude or limit the
voluntary exchange of information or discovery by
stipulation of the parties at any time prior to the date
set for trial, but in no event shall such exchanges or
stipulations require a court to grant a continuance of
the trial date.
(Amended effective January 15, 1990; April 15,
1991.)
Rule 4-503. Requests for jury instructions.
Intent:
To establish a uniform procedure for submitting
and requesting jury instructions.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to the District, Circuit and
Justice Courts.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) All jury instruction requests shall be presented
to the court five days prior to the scheduled trial date
unless otherwise ordered by the court. The court, in
its discretion, may allow the presentation of jury instructions at any time prior to the submission of the
case to the jury. At the time of presentation to the
court, a copy of the requested instructions shall be
furnished to opposing counsel.
(2) Jury instruction requests must be in writing
and state in full the instruction requested. Each request shall be upon a separate sheet of paper, the
original and copies of which shall be free from red
lines and firm names and shall be entitled:
"Instruction No.

"

The number of the request shall be written in lead
pencil.
(3) If case citations are used in support of a requested instruction, at least one copy of the requested
instruction furnished to the court shall be submitted
without the citations. Citations may be provided upon
separate sheets attached to the particular instruction
to which the citation applies.
(Amended effective January 15, 1990.)
Rule 4-504. Written orders, judgments and decrees.
Intent:
To establish a uniform procedure for submitting
written orders, judgments, and decrees to the court.
This rule is not intended to change existing law with
respect to the enforceability of unwritten agreements.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to all civil proceedings in
courts of record except small claims.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) In all rulings by a court, counsel for the party
or parties obtaining the ruling shall within fifteen
days, or within a shorter time as the court may direct,
file with the court a proposed order, judgment, or decree in conformity with the ruling.
(2) Copies of the proposed findings, judgments, and
orders shall be served upon opposing counsel before
being presented to the court for signature unless the
court otherwise orders. Notice of objections shall be
submitted to the court and counsel within five days
after service.

